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BROWN V. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS
ASSOCIATION
131 S. CT. 2729 (2011)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, the Respondent, an
association representing the video game and software industries,
challenged the Petitioner, the state of California, seeking a
declaratory judgment against enforcement of a state statute.' The
statute prohibited the sale of violent video games to minors, and it
provided for a civil fine up to $1000 if violated.2 In its judgment,
the Supreme Court of the United States struck down the statute.
The Court's decision defeated California's attempt to regulate the
sale of violent video games to minors, and in doing so, it
dramatically decreased the likelihood that future regulation on
violent content targeted at minors will pass constitutional muster.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
The challenged California statute' prohibited the sale of violent
video games to minors and required the games' packaging to be
labeled "18."' The Act covered games "in which the range of
options available to a player includes killing, maiming,
dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being. .
. ."6 A game fell into the violent category if its depictions of
violent acts (1) were rendered in a way that "[a] reasonable person,
1. Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
2. Id. at 2732-33.
3. Id. at 2742.
4. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746.1-1746.5 (West 2012).
5. Id. Section 1746.1(a) stated that a person "may not sell or rent a video
game that has been labeled as a violent video game to a minor." Id. § 1746.1.
Section 1746.2 required the video games' packaging to indicate that only buyers
18 years and older could buy violent video games. Id. § 1746.2.
6. Id. § 1746(d)(1).
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considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant
or morbid interest of minors," (2) were "patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for
minors," and (3) would cause "the game, on the whole, to lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors."'
B. Procedural History
This case is the Supreme Court's decision, which follows from
the State of California's appeal, in which the court upheld the
Entertainment Merchants Association's challenge' of the
constitutionality of California's statute on First Amendment
grounds.' At the district court level, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the
Association's motion for summary judgment, permanently
enjoining enforcement of the statute.'o The State appealed, and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
holding." The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2
7. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732. This standard was based on an obscenity
statute described in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See infra note 47
and accompanying text.
8. The Entertainment Merchants Association arose from a merger of two
organizations: The Video Software Dealers Association (the party to the district
and appellate decisions to Brown), and the Interactive Entertainment Merchants
Association. About EMA, ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.entmerch.org/about-ema/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
9. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742.
10. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 952
(9th Cir. 2009).
11. Id. at 953.
12. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 27 3 3.
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
1. The United States v. Stevens Holding Controls
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, asserted that a prior case,
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010), was controlling."
In Stevens, the Court held that legislatures may not add new
categories of speech to the limited list of classes of speech that are
not protected by the First Amendment, without persuasive
evidence of a long-standing tradition of restriction.14 Therefore,
the "government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, is subject matter, or its content."" However,
exceptions to First Amendment protection do exist; historically,
the First Amendment has not protected speech content in "a few
limited areas," such as obscenity, incitement, and fighting words. 6
California properly asserted that video games qualify for First
Amendment protection." However, according to the majority,
California tried to "make violent-speech regulation look like
obscenity regulation by mimicking a statute regulating obscenity
for minors that the Court upheld in Ginsberg v. New York." The
13. Id. at 2734.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2733 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id. The majority asserted that the First Amendment allows only limited
exceptions to free speech protection. Id. at 2733 (citing United States v.
Stevens, 130 S. Ct 1577 (2010)). Importantly, these limited areas are well-
defined, narrowly limited, and long-established. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
The Supreme Court has never held the prevention or punishment of the
aforementioned types of speech unconstitutional. Id.
17. Id. The majority reasoned that the First Amendment protects video
games, like the books, plays, and movies that preceded them, because they
communicate ideas and social messages through familiar literary devices (e.g.
characters, dialogue, music, and plot). Id.
18. Id. at 2735. In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a statute regulating obscene
speech to minors because that law merely adjusted the definition of an already
unprotected category of speech, obscenity, with respect to minors. Id. at 2735
(citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). Specifically, the law in
Ginsberg prohibited the sale to minors of obscene materials deemed "harmful to
5172012]
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Court held that violent speech is not obscene because obscene
speech contains only depictions of sexual conduct, not "whatever a
legislature finds shocking."l9 Following Stevens, the majority held
that California tried wrongly to add a new category of unprotected
content under the First Amendment.20
2. The Standard ofReview is Strict Scrutiny
Because the respondents attacked the California statute on First
Amendment grounds, the Court reviewed the issue under strict
scrutiny.2 1 The Court established that to pass strict scrutiny,
California must show (1) that the statute was justified by a
compelling government interest and (2) that the statute was
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.22  The Court held that
California's statute failed both prongs.2 3
Regarding the State's compelling interest, the Court held that the
statute legitimately served the government's interest in helping
parents control the content to which their children are exposed.24
However, the Court expressed doubt that the statute's punishment
of third parties for conveying protected speech to minors was a
proper exercise of governmental power.2 5
Regarding the question of whether the statute was narrowly
drawn, the Court held that the law was both underinclusive and
overinclusive. 26 The law was underinclusive because it singled out
video game retailers and renters for "disfavored treatment," but it
minors." Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2743. It defined what was harmful to minors by
adding the words "for minors" to each element of the definition of obscenity
established by the leading Supreme Court obscenity decisions of the time. Id.
However, in this case, the California law attempted to regulate violent speech as
an entirely new category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at
2735.
19. Id. at 2734.
20. Id. at 2734-35.
21. Id. at 2738.
22. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
23. Id. at 2742.
24. Id. at 2741.
25. Id. at 2740.
26. Id. at 2740-41.
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did not target booksellers, cartoonists, and movie producers
regarding violent content. 27  On the other hand, the law was
overinclusive because it regulated sales to minors whose parents
did not necessarily care to prevent their children from buying such
games (i.e. the law's scope was too large for its purpose).2 8
California argued that video games presented a special problem
because of their immersive interactivity; with video games, the
player participates directly in the violent action on screen.29
However, the majority reasoned that other forms of literature are
similarly immersive and interactive, but cannot be regulated."
Thus, because the law failed strict scrutiny, the Court struck it
down as invalid."1
B. Justice Alito's Concurrence
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment that the statute did not
pass constitutional muster, but he disagreed with the majority's
approach in arriving at its conclusion.32 Justice Alito believed that
Ginsberg, not Stevens, controlled the case.33 He argued three
points to support the conclusion that Ginsberg controlled.3 4
First, Justice Alito thought the statute in Stevens was different in
scope than the California statute because the Stevens statute
broadly prohibited "any person from creating, selling, or
possession depictions of animal cruelty for commercial gain."
However, in Ginsberg, and in the present case, the laws in
27. Id. at 2740.
28. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741.
29. Id. at 2737-38.
30. See id. at 2738. The Court referred to graphically descriptive choose-
your-own-adventure novels as being similarly immersive as violent video
games, and that video games only present violence in a different degree, but not
in a way that warrants regulation. Id.
31. Id. at 2742.
32. Id. at 2742.
33. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2743-47.
34. Id. at 2747.
35. Id. at 2747.
5192012]
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question merely prevented minors from purchasing certain
materials."
Secondly, Justice Alito argued that strict scrutiny, as applied to
the statute in Stevens, was the wrong standard to apply in this
case." Instead, the Court should have applied the more lenient
standard of intermediate review set forth in Ginsberg." Justice
Alito argued that as a result of the majority's decision, a State
could prohibit the sale to minors of what Ginsberg called "girlie
magazines" under intermediate review, but the State must pass
strict scrutiny to prevent minors from buying violent video
games.". Lastly, Alito noted that the outcome of Stevens "left open
the possibility that a more narrowly drawn statute targeting
depictions of animal cruelty" might be constitutional, but the
outcome of suggests that no regulation of minors' access to violent
video games is allowed.4 0
However, Ginsberg suggested that certain regulations will be
held valid.4 To Justice Alito, the California statute in the present
case reinforced parental decision making in exactly the same way
that the statute in Ginsberg did.4 2 Therefore, Ginsberg should have
controlled.4 3
Justice Alito forwent any First Amendment analysis; instead, he
simply found the statute to be too vague to uphold." Using
Ginsberg as precedent, Justice Alito stated that California's law
did not define "violent video games" with the narrow specificity
that the Constitution demanded.4 5 In an attempt to avoid First
Amendment issues, California modeled its statute after the New
York law that the Supreme Court upheld in Ginsberg.46 Then, to
bring the law within the protection of Ginsberg, California
36. Id. at 2743, 2747.
37. Id. at 2747.
38. Id.





44. Id. at 2746.
45. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2744-45.
46. Id. at 2743.
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modified its definition of violence to mirror the definition of
obscenity set forth in Miller v. California.4 In Miller, the Court
held that an obscenity statute (generally for adults) must contain a
threshold limitation that restricts the statute's scope to specifically
described "hard core" materials.48 Ginsberg adopted the obscenity
test set forth in Miller specifically for minors; thus, Ginsberg
became the precedent allowing the regulation of obscene content
with respect to minors.4 9
In the present case, California attempted to structure the statute
in a manner similar to the statute in Miller to regulate violent
speech." But Alito argued that the California law did not perform
the "narrowing function" served by the limitation in Miller." The
obscenity statute upheld in Miller defined the type of obscene
depictions of "hard core" sexual acts that were prohibited, but in
the present case, the statute was not specific enough.52 Alito
reasoned that when Miller was decided, depictions of "hard core"
sexual conduct were not part of mainstream culture, so the
description given by the statute sufficiently narrowed the
requirement in that case." However, "for better or worse," present
47. Id. at 2744. Under Miller, the standard for obscenity is that "(1) an
'average person, applying contemporary community standards [must] find ...
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest'; (2) 'the work [must]
depic[t] or describ[e], in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and' (3) 'the work, taken as a whole, [must]
lac[k] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' Id. (quoting Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
48. Id. at 2744.
49. See id. at 2743-44.
50. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2744. Adopting Miller's statutory language, the
California statute set the standard for regulating violent content to minors: .'(i)
A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find [the game]
appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors; (ii) It is patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors; and (iii)
It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors."' Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A)
(West 2012)).
51. Id. at 2745.
52. Id. Alito reasoned that the California law would more closely resemble
the limitation in Miller if it more narrowly targeted particular graphic depictions
of violence. Id. at 2745.
53. Id. at 2745.
2012] 521
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society has long regarded many depictions of violence as suitable
features of popular entertainment, including that available to
minors, so the California statute must narrowly target specific
descriptions of graphic violence.54 Thus, according to Justice
Alito, the California statute did not provide fair notice of what
made "violent video games" violent for the purpose of the statute
and was unconstitutionally vague."
C. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the law should be upheld
based on the Founders' original understanding of the First
Amendment: First Amendment protection does not stretch to
minors." Justice Thomas recounted customs of parental authority
throughout the history of the United States." By his reasoning, the
founding generation would not have included the right to speak to
children without going through their parents within the "freedom
of speech."" He noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that
there may be "some categories of speech that have been
historically unprotected [and] have not yet been specifically
identified or discussed as such in our case law," and that speech to
minors is one of those classes."
D. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer dissented separately, asserting that he would
uphold the statute against the vagueness precedent established by
the Court, as well as traditional First Amendment analysis under
strict scrutiny." Breyer would employ a two-pronged test to
determine constitutionality by applying: (1) the Court's vagueness
precedents and (2) strict scrutiny."1
54. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2745.
55. Id. at 2746.
56. Id. at 2751.
57. See id. at 2751-60.
58. Id. at 2752.
59. Id. at 2759 (quoting Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (2010)).
60. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2765, 2771.
61. Id. at 2762.
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1. Vagueness
With respect to vagueness, Justice Breyer compared the
language of the California statute to the language of the New York
statute in Ginsberg and found no substantial difference in
specificity that would render the California statute too vague.62 in
Justice Breyer's view, the words "killing and maiming" in the
California statute were no more vague than the "nudity" prohibited
by the statute in Ginsberg.63 Furthermore, California's reliance on
and use of the term "community standards" regarding violence was
no less limiting than the use of the same term in Miller, which the
Supreme Court upheld.' Lastly, Justice Breyer could find no
failure in California's reliance on arguably vague "community
standards" of unacceptable depictions of violence.65
2. Strict Scrutiny
Justice Breyer, like Justice Alito, believed that Ginsberg, not
Stevens, should have controlled this case.66 His approach to strict
scrutiny would require the satisfaction of a three prong test: The
statute must (1) be narrowly tailored, (2) further a compelling
interest, and (3) be the solution for which there is no less
restrictive alternative that would be at least as effective.67
Justice Breyer argued that the statute was sufficiently narrow
because it was not vague when compared to the statutes in
Ginsberg and Miller, after which it was modeled. 68 Furthermore,
Justice Breyer found California's interests compelling on the
ground that the statute represented California's attempt to
supplement parents' and guardians' abilities to guide child
62. Id. at 2763-64.
63. Id. at 2764.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2765.
66. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2771.
67. Id. at 2765.
68. See id. at 2763-65. After comparing the language of the statutes in depth,
Justice Breyer determined that the California statute was similar enough to those
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development and to protect the well being of California's youth."9
Lastly, Justice Breyer pointed to statistics to show that, although
the video game industry already had a rating system in place to
prevent minors from buying violent video games, that rating
system had "serious enforcement gaps."" Therefore, California's
statute represented the solution for which no less restrictive, but at
least as effective, alternative existed.
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The holding in Brown essentially precludes states from
regulating the sale of violent video games to minors, even though
the Court arguably lacks the expertise in the area of social and
behavioral sciences necessary to render socially beneficial
decisions on the matter.
Technology is advancing to the point of realism such that the
human brain may not be able to distinguish between a game and
reality. 72 For example, modern display devices, such as high-
definition TVs and cell phone screens can display images at the
resolution at which images fall upon the human retina.
Additionally, researchers continue to refine the methods by which
they manipulate human perception.74
69. Id. at 2767.
70. Id. at 2770. Justice Breyer highlighted statistics that show that the video
game industry's self-rating system was not effective at preventing the sales of
violent video games to minors. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2770. Additionally, he
suggested that the California statute may help by preventing a minor from
buying violent video games, the kind that "the industry itself. . . wants to keep
out of the hands of those under the age of 17," without the help of parents. Id. at
2766.
71. Id. at 2770.
72. JIM BLASCOVICH & JEREMY BAILENSON, INFINITE REALITY: AVATARS,
ETERNAL LIFE, NEW WORLDS, AND THE DAWN OF THE VIRTUAL REVOLUTION 1-
8 (HarperCollins, 2011).
73. See Bryan Jones, Apple Retina Display, JONESBLOG (June 24, 2010,
11:00 PM), http://prometheus.med.utah.edu/~bwjones/2010/06/apple-retina-
display/ ("Apple's Retina Display adequately represents the resolution at which
images fall upon our retina"). Id.
74. See generally Ronald W. Noel & Claudia M. Hunter, Mapping the
Physical World to Psychological Reality: Creating Synthetic Environments, in
524
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Despite the technological advances and the theoretical risks
associated with the increased level of realism they offer, the Court
suggests that video games are essentially similar to other First
Amendment-protected forms of literature, regardless of the
complexity of the technology involved. Thus, the Brown holding
stands for the proposition that sales of violent video games to
minors cannot be regulated, even though video games differ
dramatically from literature, music, graphic novels, and even
motion pictures, due to their highly interactive nature. 6 This
position is consistent with decisions rendered in other
jurisdictions. For example, in 2001, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction
based on the likelihood that a city ordinance aiming to restrict
minors' access to violent video games would be found
unconstitutional. Continuing this trend, in 2005, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found an
Illinois statute aimed at restricting the sale of violent video games
unconstitutional because it did not pass strict scrutiny.7 9
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD CONFERENCE ON DESIGNING INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS:
PROCESSES, PRACTICES, METHODS, AND TECHNIQUES 203 (Daniel Boyarski &
Wendy A. Kellogg eds., 2000), available at
http://courses.ischool.utexas.edu/WingetMegan/
MeganCollection2/files/10778/mapping%20the%20physical.pdf (discussing the
effects of various manipulations of visual stimuli that influence humans to
perceive virtual representations as real representations).
75. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
76. See id. at 2779 n.4.
77. See, e.g., Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 66-68 (2d Cir.
1997) (striking down a local law prohibiting the sale to minors of trading cards
depicting graphic violence); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d
684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992) (striking down a state statute prohibiting rental or sale
to minors of video cassettes depicting violence).
78. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 462 (2001). The court in Kendrick compared
video games to other forms of literature, such as stories, that contain themes,
messages, and ideologies. See id. at 577-79.
79. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich (ESA 11), 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051,
1075 (N.D. 111. 2005); see also Michael J. Aschenbrener, Gaming the System:
The Seventh Circuit Prefers Its Video Games Violent, Not Sexy, 2 SEVENTH
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However, the Court should not decide authoritatively on
whether or not such technological considerations should be
regulated. Justice Breyer astutely observed that numerous studies
conducted by experts in behavioral and social sciences have led to
debatable conclusions about the effects of violent video games on
minors' behavior.so Importantly, he noted that (1) the Court lacks
the expertise to determine which results are correct, and (2) the
Court should defer to expert opinions and the elected legislature's
conclusions.'
In spite of all these considerations, the Brown holding stands.
With Supreme Court precedent firmly in place, violence in video
games will likely continue to lie under the protection of the First
Amendment for a long time to come. Regulation of the sale of
video games containing such violence will continue to be difficult,
if not impossible.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Court found California's law unconstitutional
because it attempted to create a new category of unprotected
speech and it failed strict scrutiny.82 The immediate effect of this
holding is to place violent video games firmly under the protection
of the First Amendment, where they will stay for a long time to
come.
Ludwig Herard*
80. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2769 -70.
81. Id. at 2780.
82. Id. at 2742.
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